Faithful Catholics listen attentively when bishops speak on faith and morals. My original point about competence is that Bishop Wenski and his committee are overreaching. Episcopal competence is related to faith and morals, not to faith, morals, and public policy—except when, as, for example, in the instance of abortion, specific public policies are entailed in the solemn magisterial teaching of the Church on faith and morals. That is decidedly not the case in this instance.He continues:
Differences over American policy in Iraq are in the realm of prudential judgment. There are indeed moral questions involved in any policy of consequence. But when the bishops speak of “the dangerous and deteriorating situation in Iraq” and declare that the answer is to “end U.S. military engagement in Iraq,” they are making prudential judgments about eminently debatable circumstances. These are matters of fact and speculation about which people of equal or greater competence (meaning ability) disagree.MM is highly critical of Fr. Neuhaus' position and wonders whether the editor of First Things believes the Church should stay out of public policy matters of prudential judgment.
I sure hope the Church can publicize and promote its prudential judgments on matters of public policy.
Contrary to the position of Fr. Neuhaus (and Karl Keating), how we work to end abortions in our society is a matter of prudential judgment. That abortion is an evil that we should eliminate is, for Catholics, a non-negotiable issue, as Karl Keating says. Nevertheless, the means by which we seek to eliminate abortion are matters of prudential judgment.
I recognize that this distinction is not widely held in the Respect Life Movement. For instance, when assessing the pro-life credentials of a politician, the standard is almost always where the politician stands on legislation and judicial decisions pertaining to abortion. In the political sphere, ending abortion means outlawing abortion. The end and means are the same.
I beg to differ.
The legal assessment standard is a good start, but on its own it is dangerously inadequate. Laws legalizing abortion allow abortions to occur, but the law is not the reason for their occurrence. The reasons are many and varied. Yet being pro-life on the abortion issue is equated with the desire to overturn Roe v. Wade and outlaw abortion.
Outlawing abortion is one means of working to eliminate abortion, and its a very important one. It is not the only one, nor is it the most fundamental one. It is perfectly conceivable to me that a public servant could desire to outlaw abortion, have the legal power to do so, and even succeed in outlawing abortion, and yet in the long term be detrimental to the pro-life cause. If he were to say, promote a philosophical outlook in which evil could under certain circumstances be done for good, he may change laws for the immediate future that protect the unborn, but he would also influence hearts and minds, creating the philosophical foundation for such laws to be reversed and remain reversed.
Consider that according to Gallup's annual Values and Belief survey, conducted May 10-13, 2007, 49% of Americans consider themselves pro-choice, and 45% consider themselves pro-life. That may sound pretty bad to the ears of the Respect Life movement, but it's actually much worse. According to the same survey, 26% of respondents said abortion should be legal under any circumstance, 15% said legal under most, and 40% said legal under a few circumstances. So really, despite what people consider themselves, 81% of Americans are pro-choice under certain circumstances. This is a philosophical matter that the Respect Life Movement must address before it can hope to see any permanent legal protections of the unborn.
I therefore think the abortion issue should be seen as both a non-negotiable issue and a matter of prudential judgment, I think the end of ending abortion should be distinguished from the means of reaching that end, and I think the Church has a responsibility to be involved with both the end and the means, and therefore, with matters of prudential judgment.