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No Correspondence


It is ironic that certain criticisms of deconstruction and its father Derrida fall prey to the same dishonest play of words that they accuse of Derrida of perpetuating. I’m thinking here not so much of criticisms of Derrida grounded in a well-researched study of his thought, but more specifically of those criticisms that originate from knee-jerk reactions to caricatures or the sometimes disturbing themes of deconstruction, particularly those themes that call into question the stability of our structures of thought. Mark C. Taylor described these criticism thus:

To his critics, Mr. Derrida appeared to be a pernicious nihilist who threatened the very foundation of Western society and culture. By insisting that truth and absolute value cannot be known with certainty, his detractors argue, he undercut the very possibility of moral judgment. To follow Mr. Derrida, they maintain, is to start down the slippery slope of skepticism and relativism that inevitably leaves us powerless to act responsibly.
Carl E. Olsen provides an example of the criticism described by Taylor. In an article posted on Ignatius Insight, he accuses Derrida of dedicating his entire life to stupidity and confusion, of teaching that “language is meaningless, communication impossible, and life ultimately absurd,” and of seeking to destroy the nature and meaning of language. Olsen’s evidence consists of quoting one partial sentence of Derrida’s and a couple other philosophers.

Here’s a whole paragraph of Olsen’s:

To cut to the chase, Derrida taught that language is meaningless, communication impossible, and life ultimately absurd. This is all the more amazing since Derrida dedicated most of his life writing and teaching about deconstructionism. In books and lectures he insisted that words, sentences, and books cannot really say anything—or, if they do, they cannot say what the author [sic] think they say.
You know, maybe the fact of Derrida’s dedicating his life to using language to communicate about deconstruction (not an “ism”) should give Olsen cause to question whether Derrida really is the nihilist he thinks he is. Olsen also seems undecided in that last sentence about whether or not Derrida thinks words can say anything. Olsen’s “undecidability” here threatens to deconstruct his whole thesis. Point Derrida?

Olsen remarks that Derrida was “an atheist who had little patience for religion or the belief in the supernatural.” That would be news to John D. Caputo, who’s made a living drawing out (or just drawing?) the religious dimensions of Derrida’s thought, an interpretive project praised by Derrida himself. It would be news to Louis Dupré, who while writing on the idea of religious truth, noted, “[Derrida’s] philosophy of the creative word breaking through the given, whereby the signifier transcends the signified, appears, paradoxically, to reopen the way to religious transcendence.” It would have been news to Derrida, who wrote some books in which he explored religious mystery, such as The Gift of Death.

The criticism of Derrida from William A. Borst is another example. He blames Derrida for the West’s (particularly liberals’) illiteracy and moral confusion. George Weigel frequently refers to the demolishing plague of postmodernism and deconstruction. Given the misrepresentation that Catholicism receives in our culture, I’d expect these Catholic critics, who declare themselves the defenders of Truth, to be more sensitive to accurately describing philosophies that are not their own and to providing sufficient evidence to support their statements about them. If Derrida is bad news, these critics too often make poor arguments in defense of that proposition. These supposed critics of Derrida charge that his philosophy bears no resemblance to reality; ironically, the object of their criticisms bears no resemblance to Derrida.